

# Open Sessions: Programme

# Sunday July 11, 13.30-16.30

The Open Sessions take place on the first floor of the Newman Building

Topic/Location/ Chair	13:30-14:00	14:00-14:30	14:30-15:00	15:00-15:30	15:30-16:00	16:00-16:30
<b>Epistemology I</b> Room A105  Chair Paul O'Grady	1. Sebastiano Moruzzi University of Bologna <b>Annalisa Coliva</b> U of Modena <i>Relativism, Disagreement and Multimundism Relativism</i>	2. Eline Busck <b>Gundersen</b> CSMN University of Oslo and Aarhus University <i>Response-dependence, Biconditionals and Reference fixing</i>	3. Christopher Green U Mississippi <i>The Epistemic Parity of Testimony and Perception: Responses to Some Purported Disanalogies</i>	4. Elseijn Kingma Kings College London <i>Realism and Social Constructivism: a two-step model</i>	5. Eyja M. Brynjarsdóttir University of Iceland <i>Can a Remote object be lovely?</i>	6. Earl Stanley B. Fronda University of the Philippines <i>Why miracles cannot be a persuasive evidence of divinity</i>
<b>Epistemology II</b> Room A 106  Chair James Levine	1. Anandi Hattiangadi Oxford <i>The Love of Truth</i>	2. Kourken Michaelian Institut Jean-Nicod (CNRS-EHESS-ENS) <i>Metacognition and Endorsement</i>	3. Huiming Ren Zhejiang University <i>On Knowing How</i>	4. Conor McHugh Institut Jean Nicod Doxastic <i>Voluntarism: Still False</i>	5. Daniel Whiting University of Southampton <i>The Good and the True (or the Bad and the False')</i>	6. Georgi Gardiner U Edinburgh (UK)/ Northwestern University (USA) <i>Stroud's Tortoise and Kvanvig's Relations</i>
<b>Ethics II</b> Room A 109  Chair Margaret Hodges	1. Andrew Aberdein Florida Institute of Technology <i>Are arguments for the censorship of pornography self-refuting?</i>	2. Sandy Berkovski Bilkent University <i>Welfare, agency, and illusion</i>	3. Madeleine Hayenhjelm UCL <i>Trust as Comfortable Defocusing: A Proposal</i>	4. Richard Hull NUI Galway <i>Re-thinking the category of 'the disabled'</i>	5. Tony Milligan U Aberdeen <i>Abortion and 'Throwing Away'</i>	6. Christopher Cowley UCD <i>'It's so hard to say sorry': a paradox about apologising for deliberate wrongdoing</i>
<b>History of Philosophy (Ancient)</b> Room F 103A  Chair John Callanan	1. Dimitrios Dentsoras University of Manitoba <i>The Birth of Supererogation</i>	2. T.J. Crowley UCD <i>The Things That Are Called 'Elements'</i>	3. Timothy Chappell The Open University <i>Aristotelian Practical Truth</i>	4. Fran O'Rourke UCD <i>Aristotle and Evolutionary Altruism</i>	5. Catarina Belo The American University in Cairo <i>Chance and Causality in Avicenna and Averroes</i>	6. Jeremy Koons Georgetown University (Qatar) <i>On the Failure of Some Recent Responses to the Euthyphro Dilemma</i>

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<b>Metaethics II</b> Room J109  Chair James Mahon	1. Andras Sziget Central European University <i>Responsibility and            Personhood: the            Normativity of            Responsibility</i>	2. Nicholas Shackel University of Cardiff <i>Reasons:            Rationalisers and            Justifiers</i>	3. Makoto Suzuki Nagoya U and Nanzan U, Japan <i>'They Ought to Do            This, but They Can't':            The Two Types of            Deontic Evaluation</i>	4. Michael Winter University of St. Thomas <i>Does Moral Virtue            Require Knowledge?</i>	5. Jussi Suikkanen University of Reading <i>In Defence of Wide-            Scope End-Given            Reasons</i>	6. Joel Rickard Kent University <i>Is Moral Intuitionism            a Type of            Foundationalism?</i>
<b>Metaphysics II</b> Room F 102  Chair Andrew Jorgensen	1. Daniele Sgaravatti University of St Andrews <i>Begging the            Question: a Bad Form            of Reasoning</i>	2. Carrie Jenkins University of Nottingham <i>Is Metaphysical            Grounding            Irreflexive?</i>	3. Nathaniel Forde TCD <i>Ontological Disputes            Deflated–Rival            Approaches to            Semantic Evaluation</i>	4. Matthew Parker University of Bristol <i>Ontology and            Understanding</i>	5. Nick Tosh NUI, Galway <i>Objective Chance and            Possible Worlds</i>	6. Elisa Paganini Università degli Studi di Milano <i>Vague Existence</i>
<b>Metaphysics III</b> Room G 102  Chair Peter Simons	1. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski University of Salzburg <i>Intentional Objects            and Demonstrative            Reference</i>	2. David Liggins University of Manchester <i>Dorr on the Language            of Ontology</i>	3. JC Westerhoff University of Durham <i>Is there an            ontologically            fundamental level?</i>	4. Pål Antonsen TCD <i>Antirealism and            Existence</i>	5. Niall Connolly TCD <i>Two Defences of            the Bare Particular            Theory and a Third            Way</i>	
<b>Philosophy of            Action</b> Room C108  Chair Rowland Stout	1. Marc Pavlopoulos CEA, France <i>Is there a Practical            use of Reason?</i>	2. Murray Clarke Concordia University <i>Misrepresentation            Ain't In the Head</i>	3. Chris Mole UBC <i>Memory and            Phenomenal            Knowledge</i>	4. Rasmus Jensen UCD <i>A Disjunctivist            Conception of Bodily            Movement?</i>	5. Joel Walmsley University College Cork <i>Coupling            Constitution and the            Dynamical Approach            to Cognition</i>	

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<b>Philosophy of Language II</b> Room F 104  Chair Douglas Edwards	1. Jonathan Ichikawa University of St Andrews <i>What is the semantic blindness argument to contextualism?</i>	2. Richard Hamilton TCD <i>Can We Aim at Relative Truth?</i>	3. Mihaela Popa University of Geneva <i>What's left of truth-conditional criteria? Metaphor is still truth-conditional!</i>	4. Simon Summers UEA <i>Davidson's Solution to the Problem of Predication: Would Less Be More?</i>	5. Peter Milne University of Stirling <i>Jennifer Lackey on the Insufficiency of Knowledge for Assertion</i>	6. Luis Fernández Moreno Complutense University of Madrid <i>Two Kripkean Theses Revisited</i>
<b>Philosophy of Mind III</b> Room G 109  Chair Ruth Egan	1. Sophie Rietti University of Ottawa <i>Knowing what you feel, and knowing what about</i>	2. Albert Newen Ruhr Universität Bochum <i>The Person-Model Theory of Understanding Other Minds</i>	3. Miguel García-Valdecasas University of Navarra <i>Some Woes of Davidson's Concept of First Person Authority</i>	4. Guido Melchior U Graz <i>A Privileged Access to Other Minds</i>	5. Anna C. Zielinska University of Grenoble <i>Cartesian origins of the Reasons/ Causes Debate in the Philosophy of Action</i>	6. Jens Harbecke Tel Aviv University <i>How causal are mental counterfactuals?</i>
<b>Philosophy of Mind IV</b> Room G 106  Chair James O'Shea	1. Heather Logue University of Leeds <i>Disjunctivism, Naive Realism, and the Science of Perceptual Experience</i>	2. Matthew Conduct U Durham <i>Charles Bonnet Syndrome and the Philosophy of Perception</i>	3. Simone Marini UCD <i>Does Non-Substantive Phenomenalism Survive Chisholm's Criticism?</i>	4. Michael Sollberger U Lausanne <i>Synaesthesia and the Structural Approach to Perceptual Content</i>	5. Jason Leddington Bucknell University <i>What We Hear</i>	6. Robert Foley UCD <i>The Curious Case of the Blind Man Walking</i>
<b>Political Philosophy/Law</b> Room C 110  Chair David Walsh	1. Thom Brooks University of Newcastle <i>A New Problem with the Capabilities Approach</i>	2. Gerard Casey UCD <i>Where does law come from?</i>	3. Vittorio Bufacchi University College Cork <i>A Deflationary theory of Human Rights</i>	4. Brian Flanagan UCD <i>Lon Fuller's Puzzle for Legal Intentionalism</i>	5. Timo Jütten UCD <i>Respect for Persons</i>	6. Orsolya Reich Central European University <i>The Citizenship Insurance</i>